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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER TRUMP
DOUG WILLIAMS*
ABSTRACT
This Article addresses some of the challenges in teaching environmental law
after the administration of President Donald Trump. The Trump Administration
mounted a relentless, aggressive, and largely deregulatory overhaul of the
nation’s major environmental regulatory efforts, particularly the efforts of the
prior Obama Administration. Many of these efforts by the Trump Administration
have been challenged in court, some successfully, while others have been
reversed or are in the process of reversal by the administration of President
Joseph Biden. For teachers of environmental law, these actions present
opportunities to demonstrate how regulatory agencies (under the direction of
presidents), rather than Congress, have become the driving force of change in
environmental regulation and the limits of that approach to addressing the
nation’s environmental issues. The Article surveys recent administrative action
under the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, and the
Clean Air Act and how these matters were addressed in a basic environmental
law survey course.

* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, regulation to protect the environment, despite its
bipartisan roots, has for decades been a highly partisan issue. 1 Democrats and
Republicans have been at odds on just about every environmental policy issue
of any significance. With few exceptions, Congress has passed no new,
significant environmental legislation since the 1990 amendments to the Clean
Air Act (“CAA”). 2 Nonetheless, the shape and content of environmental
regulation continues to evolve and change as different presidential
administrations, acting through federal agencies, principally the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”), shape policy and law. This is formally done by
exercising statutorily-conferred authority through rulemaking, guidance,
adjudications, and enforcement priorities and policies. 3 In most cases, EPA
enjoys considerable discretion about the content of its actions, a consequence of
Congress’s proclivity to delegate broadly to agencies. 4 How that agency
discretion is exercised is often informed and shaped by the commitments and
policy preferences of the incumbent president—a result that the federal courts
generally recognize as legitimate and consistent with our constitutional form of
government. 5
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Republican administration of President
Donald J. Trump sought to reverse or revise some of the regulatory measures
put in place by EPA and other federal agencies under Democratic President
Barack Obama or other, preceding administrations. 6 Indeed, in his 2016
presidential campaign, Donald Trump repeatedly pledged to pursue an
1. See Jaime Fuller, Environmental Policy is Partisan. It Wasn’t Always., WASH. POST (June
2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/06/02/support-for-the-clean-airact-has-changed-a-lot-since-1970/.
2. See Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law Without Congress, 30 J. LAND USE & ENV’T
L., 15, 27 (2014) (noting absence of new legislation since 1990). Since Professor Lazarus’s 2014
article, Congress in 2016, in a rare bipartisan moment of environmental policymaking, enacted the
Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 114–182, 130 Stat. 448
(2016) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629). This legislation significantly amends the Toxic
Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629 (2012)).
3. See CRAIG N. JOHNSTON ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 98–110
(LEG, Inc. d/b/a West Academic 4th ed. 2018) [hereinafter LEGAL PROTECTION].
4. See, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–76 (2001)
(discussing broad delegations of authority to agencies).
5. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (noting
that “[w]hile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make . . . policy choices”); Sierra
Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that “[t]he authority of the President to
control and supervise executive policymaking is derived from the Constitution; the desirability of
such control is demonstrable from the practical realities of administrative rulemaking.”).
6. Richard J. Lazarus, The Super Wicked Problem of Donald Trump, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1811,
1844 (2020).
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aggressive dismantling of Obama-era regulations, particularly those relating to
efforts to control pollutants that contribute to global climate change. 7 Trump
even went so far as to suggest dismantling EPA itself. 8
It is common for new administrations to pursue environmental regulation
and policy that differs from that of preceding administrations. For example, the
Obama Administration aggressively used its authority under the CAA to
regulate emissions of pollutants that contribute to climate change in ways that
the preceding Bush Administration declined to pursue. 9 But the Trump
Administration moved much more rapidly and much more aggressively than
preceding administrations to rework the landscape of environmental regulation,
pursuing a broad and deep overhaul of regulations spanning the field of
environmental law. 10 Indeed, Trump’s efforts to deregulate have been described
as “relentless.” 11 During its four years in power, the Trump Administration
“officially reversed, revoked or otherwise rolled back” nearly 100
environmental rules. 12 An additional dozen or so regulatory rollbacks were in
progress but not completed when Joseph R. Biden Jr. assumed the presidency in
2021. 13 Even these numbers understate the significance of Trump’s deregulatory

7. See Samantha Gross, What is the Trump Administration’s Record on the Environment?,
BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/what-is-thetrump-administrations-track-record-on-the-environment/ (“The Trump administration has been
particularly focused on rolling back actions intended to deal with climate change.”).
8. See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 1840–43, 1847 (describing candidate Trump’s positions on
climate change); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Trump Administration, 4 EMORY
CORP. GOVERN. & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 225, 225, 230 (2017) (describing candidate Trump’s
campaign promises relating to environmental law).
9. See Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Climate Change, 2009-2016, 42 HARV. ENV’T L. REV.
231, 241–68 (2018) (discussing Bush and Obama Administrations’ climate change actions). To
illustrate the breadth of Trump’s attack on existing environmental regulation, the Trump
Department of Energy moved to repeal or roll back energy efficiency requirements for light bulbs.
See John Schwartz, Trump Administration Blocks Energy Efficiency Rule for Light Bulbs, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/20/climate/trump-light-bulb-roll
back.html.
10. For a catalogue of the Trump administration’s action on the environment, see HARVARD
LAW SCHOOL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY LAW PROGRAM, REGULATORY TRACKER,
https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/portfolios/environmental-governance/regulatory-rollback-tracker/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2022) [hereinafter REG. TRACKER].
11. Lisa Friedman, Trump’s Move Against Landmark Environmental Law Caps a Relentless
Agenda, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/climate/trump-nepaenvironment.html.
12. Nadja Popovich et al., The Trump Administration Rolled Back More Than 100
Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2020/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks-list.html.
13. Id.
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efforts. 14 For example, the Trump Administration reduced funding for EPA and
introduced procedural reforms and policies that could have a lasting impact on
the Agency’s ability to address environmental issues. 15 Some have also noted
that the exodus of employees at EPA during the Trump Administration, resulting
in a “loss of critical and longstanding agency expertise[,] may well be the single
most harmful, long-lasting impact on environmental protection of the Trump
Presidency.” 16
The nature and extent of the Trump Administration’s assault on existing
environmental regulation pose some challenges for those of us that teach courses
in environmental law, particularly basic survey courses like the one I teach at
Saint Louis University School of Law. 17 In this Article, I will describe how some
of these actions were addressed during the course I offered in the fall semester
of 2020.
I. SITUATING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION & CHANGE WITHIN THE
BROADER STRUCTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
To understand and analyze the Trump Administration’s deregulatory efforts,
it is important, first, to know that these efforts were not pursued by way of
legislation but, instead, through administrative action, including presidential
action and agency rulemaking. Particularly with respect to agency rulemaking,
students need a rudimentary understanding of the broader structure of
administrative law and the opportunities it offers for, as well as the constraints
it imposes on, regulatory change.
Many students in environmental law survey courses may have little or no
background in basic administrative law. At my school, for example, we
recommend that students take administrative law prior to enrolling in the basic
environmental law course, but administrative law is not a required prerequisite
for the course. Environmental law casebooks typically include some basic
materials on administrative law and its relation to environmental law. 18 I

14. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENT 2021: WHAT COMES NEXT? 10–
14 (2020), https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/environment-2021_0.pdf (discussing
Trump executive orders, including procedural impacts).
15. See id.
16. Lazarus, supra note 6, at 1848; see also Inara Scott et al., Environmental Law. Disrupted.,
49 ENV’T L. REP. 10038, 10054 (noting that “the [Trump] Administration is also disrupting federal
environmental law by dismantling the agencies that carry out those laws.”).
17. The coverage included in this basic course generally focuses on federal law and includes
the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act. I also include materials on common law actions for environmental harm and a
brief discussion of constitutional limitations on environmental regulation and litigation in the
federal courts.
18. See LEGAL PROTECTION, supra note 3, at 98–110.
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commonly devote at least one class period early in the course to providing
students with an administrative law mini-course, focusing primarily on
administrative procedure and the scope of judicial review of agency actions.
Since it is vital for environmental law students to understand the procedural
requirements agencies must observe when pursuing regulatory initiatives, as
well as the forms litigation takes when agency actions are challenged, spending
a little class time on administrative law basics has proved to be an investment
with real dividends.
Students must first appreciate that binding regulatory requirements, even
longstanding agency rules, can be altered by an agency vested with the statutory
authority to do so. 19 But agencies may not simply revoke or revise existing rules
by decree; they must follow certain procedural requirements, some of which can
be time-consuming and require significant investment of agency resources. 20
Indeed, “administrative law checks and balances work to limit [a new
presidential administration’s] ability to change a rule based on purely political
factors . . . .” 21
Since most environmental regulation comes by way of informal agency
rulemaking rather than more formal rulemaking processes or through case-bycase adjudication, the general “notice and comment” rulemaking procedures of
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) typically apply. 22 The APA defines
rulemaking to include not only the “formulat[ion]” of a rule, but also the
“process for . . . amending, or repealing a rule.” 23 The APA also includes
procedural requirements that govern all rulemakings, including repeals of
existing rules, unless a specific exception is applicable. 24 These notice and
19. Another way that agency regulations can be altered is through the legislative process.
Congress can, of course, repeal existing rules, provided that the President signs such legislation or
the Congress overrides a presidential veto. In some cases, a fast-track procedure known as the
Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808, can be employed to void recently promulgated
regulations, and it has been used in recent presidential transitions. For a discussion of the
Congressional Review Act, see Bethany A. Davis Noll & Richard L. Revesz, Regulation in
Transition, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14–23 (2019). The Congressional Review Act was recently used
to void a Trump administration EPA rule that rescinded or revised volatile organic compounds and
methane regulatory requirements for oil and gas facilities. This action effectively restored
regulations promulgated by the Obama administration to control emissions of these two pollutants.
See Jeff Brady, Biden Signs Bill to Restore Regulations on Climate-Warming Methane Emissions,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO: MORNING EDITION (June 30, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/28/991635
101/congress-votes-to-restore-regulations-on-climate-warming-methane-emissions.
20. Stephen M. Johnson, Killing WOTUS 2015: Why Three Rulemakings May not be Enough,
64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 373, 374 (2020) [hereinafter Killing WOTUS].
21. Id.
22. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (establishing procedural requirements for “rulemaking”).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 551.
24. See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 101 (2015) (noting that the APA
“mandate[s] that agencies use the same procedures when they amend or repeal a rule as they used
to issue the rule in the first instance.”).
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comment procedures generally require the responsible agency to undergo a
public process in which interested parties may participate in the rulemaking. 25
Students must appreciate that the notice and comment process provides an
opportunity for lawyers (and others) to submit evidence and argument to the
agency in support of their clients’ positions on a proposed rule. Participation in
the rulemaking process may also be necessary to preserve any objections to the
agency’s action should judicial review of that agency action later be sought. 26
In the environmental law context, students must also be aware that the
APA’s procedural requirements may be supplemented or replaced by more
particular procedures included in environmental legislation, such as the Clean
Air Act. 27 The CAA, like the APA, specifies procedures governing both the
“promulgation or revision” of most rules issued by EPA under the CAA. 28 These
procedures are like those required by the APA, but in many particulars are more
stringent than the bare APA requirements governing notice and comment
rulemaking.
In terms of judicial review, I focus primarily on approaches to reviewing
agencies’ interpretations of law—specifically interpretations of the agency’s
enabling act—and the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review governing
agency fact-finding and policy choices. But since this is an environmental law
course, not an administrative law course, my review necessarily must be
truncated. Two prominent cases can provide students with some basics as well
as insights about how courts review efforts by agencies to change their rules and
policies—Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council 29 and Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. 30
Chevron is, of course, a foundational case in which the Court articulated the
well-known two-part “test” for courts to apply when reviewing agency
interpretations of the statutes Congress has charged the agencies to implement. 31
25. See generally Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2018–7, Public Engagement in
Rulemaking, 84 Fed. Reg. 2146 (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-0206/pdf/2019-01284.pdf.
26. The failure to raise issues or challenges during the agency rulemaking process can result
in denial of judicial review of the issue or challenge. See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 286
F.3d 554, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“It is well established that issues not raised in comments before
the agency are waived and this Court will not consider them.”).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (establishing procedural requirements for most rulemakings under
the Clean Air Act).
28. See id.
29. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
30. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
31. The Court in Chevron held, “When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed
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I reserve detailed and more sophisticated treatment of Chevron for courses in
administrative law. For purposes of the environmental law course, it is sufficient
for students to understand that in many circumstances, it is up to agencies
(including EPA), rather than the courts, to determine how ambiguous statutory
language may be interpreted in service of appropriate policy and regulatory
objectives. But Chevron also provides an opportunity to explore how an agency,
in the exercise of its discretionary authority, can interpret statutory language to
support changes that the incumbent administration deems desirable to pursue.
The famous “bubble concept” at the heart of the rule being reviewed in Chevron
was, after all, a significant effort at deregulation fueled by the Reagan
Administration’s government-wide regulatory review. 32 To explore an agency’s
ability to reverse or amend polices, I typically ask students whether EPA, at the
insistence of a new President, could revoke the bubble concept and the plantwide definition of “stationary source,” which the Court approved in Chevron. I
ask them to consider the Court’s statement:
The fact that the agency has from time to time changed its interpretation of the
term ‘source’ does not . . . lead us to conclude that no deference should be
accorded the agency’s interpretation of the statute. An initial agency
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to
engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the
wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis. 33

I also ask them to consider what limits might cabin the agency’s
discretionary authority. What kind of explanation must the agency provide to
make its interpretation of ambiguous statutory language “reasonable”?
Like Chevron, State Farm arises in the context of the Reagan
Administration’s efforts to reduce regulatory requirements for businesses—in

the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute,
as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 842–43 (internal
citations omitted). The scholarly literature on Chevron is voluminous. For some recent articles and
commentary, see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, Geo. L.J. 1613 (2019); Kristine E. Hickman
& Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, Duke L.J. 931 (2021).
32. In the rulemaking adopting the bubble concept for nonattainment areas, EPA stated, “The
decision to reconsider the [bubble concept for] . . . nonattainment area new source review has been
made in the context of a Government-wide reexamination of regulatory burdens and complexities
that is now in progress. . . The Agency has concluded that the . . . rules being proposed today will
substantially reduce the burdens imposed on the regulated community without significantly
interfering with timely achievement of the goals of the Clean Air Act.” Requirements for
Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of
Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 16,281 (Mar. 12, 1981).
33. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64.
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this case, the automobile manufacturing industry. 34 The National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) conducted a rulemaking to revoke
the agency’s passive restraint standard—a regulation that required automobile
manufacturers to install either automatic seatbelts or airbags. 35 In setting aside
this agency action, the Court importantly held that an agency’s revocation or
modification of a rule is subject to the same standard of review as an agency’s
promulgation of a new rule—here, the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious”
standard. 36 The Court notes that “the direction in which an agency chooses to
move does not alter the standard of judicial review established by law” and “an
agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned
analysis for the change . . . .” 37 In this case, NHTSA “failed to present an
adequate basis and explanation for rescinding the passive restraint requirement
. . . .” 38
The Court in State Farm provided a classic formulation of the arbitrary and
capricious standard, one that can advance students’ understanding about what to
look for in making arguments for or against a challenged agency action. 39 The
Court helpfully explained that while “review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard is narrow,” agencies have a responsibility to provide a “rational
connection between the facts found and the choice[s] made” 40 by the agencies
and whether the agencies have “considere[d] . . . the relevant factors” or made
“a clear error of judgment.” 41 The Court also noted:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed
to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise. The reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for such
deficiencies; we may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the
agency itself has not given. . . . We will, however, “uphold a decision of less
than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” 42
34. For an interesting review of the State Farm decision, see Jerry L. Mashaw, The Story of
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.: Law, Science and Politics in the Administrative State, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 335,
335 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
35. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 37–38 (1983).
36. Id. at 41–42.
37. Id. at 42.
38. Id. at 34.
39. Id.
40. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168 (1962)).
41. Id. at 43 (quoting Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,
419 U. S. 281, 285 (1974)).
42. Id.
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Together, Chevron and State Farm provide a good starting point for
analyzing many of the cases encountered in a basic environmental law survey
course. They are especially helpful for probing the legal basis for the Trump
Administration’s deregulatory efforts as well as potential vulnerabilities those
efforts may encounter when challenged in federal court. As others have
demonstrated, many of the Trump Administration’s deregulatory efforts have
been thwarted by the courts due to agencies’ failures to observe basic
administrative law requirements. 43
II. TRUMP’S EFFORTS TO DISMANTLE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Despite the wide-ranging nature of Trump’s assault on environmental
regulation, the basic environmental law course I offer provides only limited
opportunities to explore these deregulatory efforts. Nonetheless, the
opportunities that do exist involve some of the most critical issues in
contemporary environmental law and arise under key statutory programs: the
National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Clean Air Act.
A.

Environmental Impacts, Public Information, & Agency Decisionmaking—
Narrowing the Scope of the National Environmental Policy Act

My students’ first extended encounter with an environmental statute and an
agency’s efforts to implement it involves the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”) and the Council on Environmental Quality’s (“CEQ”) influential
regulations. 44 Our study of NEPA also provides a first look at the Trump
Administration’s attack on environmental regulation.
NEPA, viewed by many as the “Magna Carta of global environmental
law,” 45 requires “all agencies of the Federal Government” to prepare “a detailed
statement . . . on the environmental impact” of any “major Federal action[]” that
may be proposed by those agencies if the proposed action may “significantly
affect[] the quality of the human environment.” 46 The detailed statement has
become known as an “EIS” or environmental impact statement. The NEPA
process “is intended to help government make informed decisions, encourage
the public to participate in those decisions, and make the government
43. See, e.g., Killing WOTUS, supra note 20, at 396–99. Professor Johnson reports that,
“[w]hile federal agencies historically have prevailed in about 70% of the cases brought against
them alleging violations of the Administrative Procedures Act, federal agencies in the Trump
Administration only prevailed in about 6% of the cases decided by March, 2019.” Id. at 396.
44. The CEQ regulations are binding on other federal agencies. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (2020).
The courts extend considerable deference to these regulations when entertaining NEPA cases. See,
e.g., Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 372 (1989) (noting that “CEQ regulations . . .
are entitled to substantial deference.”).
45. Robert L. Glicksman & Alejandro E. Camacho, The Trump Card: Tarnishing Planning,
Democracy, and the Environment, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 10281, 10281 (2020).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i).
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accountable for its decisions.” 47 Indeed, “[p]ublic participation is a central part
of the NEPA process.” 48 Thus, the EIS and information generated by agencies
during NEPA processes contribute to more transparent and more informed
agency decisions. In some cases, NEPA also fuels controversy and can yield
confrontational encounters between a federal agency and interested members of
the public. Litigation over an agency’s compliance with NEPA, while
representing a very small percentage of all agency actions subject to NEPA, is
common. 49
NEPA does not require agencies to avoid or mitigate the environmental
impacts of their proposals. Although the Supreme Court has characterized
NEPA as “action-forcing” legislation, it has also held that “NEPA itself does not
mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process.” 50 While
the agency must identify, consider, and evaluate environmental impacts,
including alternatives to the proposed action, 51 “the agency is not constrained
by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental costs.” 52
To achieve the benefits of transparency, public participation, and agency
accountability, it is undoubtedly true that NEPA adds to the costs of
implementing and the completion times for federal actions. Those costs may, of
course, be offset by the benefits of reducing environmental impacts by
implementing a less environmentally destructive alternative or measures to
mitigate adverse environmental impacts. But an EIS can take several years to
complete and run into the hundreds of pages. 53 It should be noted, however, that
these delays affect a very small number of proposed agency actions. NEPA
compliance generally does not require the completion of a full-blown EIS;
indeed, CEQ has estimated that less than one percent of federal agency project
47. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: LITTLE
INFORMATION EXISTS ON NEPA ANALYSES, GAO-14-369, at 15 (Apr. 2014).
48. Id. at 15–16. See also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349
(1989) (NEPA “ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will
carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts; it also
guarantees that the relevant information will be made available to the larger audience that may also
play a role in both the decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision.”).
49. See John Ruple & Heather Tanana, Debunking the Myths Behind the NEPA Review
Process, 35 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 14, 16 (2020) (estimating that .22% of NEPA decisions by agencies
are subject to litigation).
50. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 350.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii).
52. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 350.
53. A recent report by the CEQ found that for the period 2013–2018, the average length of an
EIS was 661 pages, while the median length was 447 pages. COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, LENGTH
OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS 1 (June 12, 2020), https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/nepapractice/CEQ_EIS_Length_Report_2020-6-12.pdf. Data on the government-wide costs of
preparing EISs are not readily available, though some agencies do have some cost data. See GAO14-369, supra note 38, at 10–13. The same report notes that data for 2012 showed that the average
preparation time for EISs was 4.6 years. Id. at 13.
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proposals require (or at least yield) an EIS. 54 Most agency proposals—as many
as ninety-five percent—are excluded from the EIS requirement because they fall
within categories of actions which the agencies have pre-determined do not
normally have the potential for significant environmental impacts. 55 The process
for avoiding an EIS in this way is known as a “categorical exclusion” (“CE”).56
Many additional projects are found to have no significant impacts after an
“environmental assessment,” or EA, which is a less intensive analysis of
environmental impacts than an EIS and can usually be completed quickly and at
a fraction of the costs of an EIS. 57
Projects that do require the preparation of an EIS are typically large,
complex projects and may be high-profile actions or large infrastructure
projects. These projects generate considerable official and public attention, like
the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipeline projects. 58 Especially in these
kinds of projects, the costs and time associated with NEPA compliance may be
increased by litigation over the agency’s compliance with NEPA. 59 At the same
time, it is generally these projects that are controversial precisely because of the
significant environmental impacts they will have if completed. Often the need

54. See id. at 7.
55. GAO-14-369, supra note 38, at 7.
56. See id. at 3. The categorical exclusions are authorized by the CEQ’s NEPA regulations,
see 40 C.F.R. §§ 1507.3(e)(2), 1508.1(d). Categorical exclusions are normally adopted by an
agency through a notice and comment rulemaking process. See, e.g., Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review, Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 86 Fed. Reg. 24,514 (May 7, 2021).
57. The CEQ regulations authorize EAs when the agency’s proposed action is not likely to
have significant environmental impacts or when the impacts are unknown and neither a categorical
exclusion applies nor has the agency decided to prepare an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.5(a). The
regulations define an EA as “a concise public document prepared by a Federal agency to aid an
agency’s compliance with the Act and support its determination of whether to prepare an
environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant impact.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.1(h). If an
EA finds that the proposed project will have significant environmental impacts, the agency must
prepare an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 6.200(a).
58. See Indigenous Env’t Network v. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 591 (D. Mont.
2018), vacated as moot, 2019 WL 2542756 (9th Cir. 2019) (Keystone XL project); Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101, 111 (D.D.C. 2017) (Dakota Access
pipeline). See Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Jewell, 840 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 2016) (Challenges on
NEPA grounds to large infrastructure projects span the gamut, including wind farms), Grand
Canyon Trust v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 290 F.3d 339, 339–40 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (airports), Utahns
for Better Transp. v. Dep’t of Transp., 319 F.3d 1207, 1161 (10th Cir. 2003) (major highway
projects), Backcountry Against Dumps v. Chu, 215 F. Supp. 3d 966, 972 (S.D. Cal. 2015), app.
dismissed, 2018 WL 1989500 (9th Cir 2018) (electrical transmission projects).
59. For an effort to assess the effects NEPA has on agency decisionmaking and litigation, see
Ruple & Tanana, supra note 40.
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for, and benefits of, such projects are highly contested. 60 And in these
circumstances, transparency, public participation, and agency accountability
may be especially warranted.
Over the years since NEPA was enacted and across several Congresses and
presidential administrations, efforts have been made to streamline the NEPA
process to reduce its costs and delays. 61 This is understandable for a variety of
reasons—some good, some more questionable. In many cases, the push to
streamline NEPA is understandable because political leaders benefit from large
infrastructure projects that are highly visible and provide tangible benefits to
some of their constituents; in these circumstances, leaders will want to get
projects done quickly to ensure they receive credit for them. By contrast, there
may be little opposition to streamlining in some cases because the environmental
costs of such projects may be less visible and less immediate, or may be
distributed among the population in ways that do not generate significant
political opposition, perhaps raising significant environmental justice
concerns. 62 The Trump Administration, however, mounted a sustained effort to
reduce NEPA’s influence and its ability to be used as a legal tool to question the
need or wisdom of major federal projects. In the process, those efforts have
likely reduced the effectiveness of NEPA as an “action-forcing” statute that
promotes agency transparency, reasoned and informed agency decisionmaking,
and robust public participation in agency actions. 63
President Trump’s assault on existing NEPA practices began almost
immediately. On January 30, 2017, just ten days after assuming office, Trump
signed Executive Order 13766, which announced a policy “to streamline and
expedite, in a manner consistent with law, environmental reviews and approvals

60. Kevin DeGood, The Importance of NEPA Review for Infrastructure Projects, Report, CTR.
(Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/importance-nepareview-infrastructure-projects/.
61. For a review of some of those efforts, see Sam Kalen, NEPA’s Trajectory: Our Waning
Environmental Charter from Nixon to Trump?, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 1039 (2020).
62. “The purpose of an environmental justice analysis is to determine whether a project will
have a disproportionately adverse effect on minority and low income populations.” Mid States
Coal. For Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 541 (8th Cir. 2003). For a recent example
of a court finding an agency’s NEPA analysis inadequate in respect to environmental justice
concerns, see Standing Rock Sioux, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 136–40. CEQ has issued guidance to
agencies on how to address environmental justice in NEPA analysis. COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY,
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: GUIDANCE UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
(Dec. 10, 1997), https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/ceq-regulations-and-guidance/regs/ej/justice.pdf. For a
summary, see ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/environmental-justiceand-national-environmental-policy-act (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).
63. See, e.g., Glicksman & Camacho, supra note 36, at 10289.
FOR AM. PROGRESS
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for all infrastructure projects.” 64 Additional executive orders followed. 65 In
Executive Order 13783, President Trump directed CEQ to rescind its Final
Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in [NEPA]
Reviews. 66 The order also rescinded an interagency working group’s
determinations and protocol regarding how the social cost of carbon may be
calculated and used in regulatory impact analysis. 67
An interesting question I raised for my class concerned the effect of these
executive orders on agencies’ NEPA analyses and judicial review of those
analyses. The orders themselves all include boilerplate language to the effect
that they are not to be construed to affect or impair agencies’ legal authority, but
their effect on an agency’s discretionary authority remains somewhat
uncertain. 68 At the time of my class, a number of courts had entertained NEPA
challenges after these executive orders were issued. Some considered the
manner in which agencies addressed the impact of their proposed actions in
terms of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. 69 For example, in Sierra
Club v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit held that an EIS was inadequate because the
agency failed to provide a quantitative estimate of the downstream greenhouse
gas emissions resulting from its approval of a natural gas pipeline project. 70 The
court also directed the agency to consider on remand whether using a social cost
of carbon methodology might usefully link the quantified emissions to climate
change impacts. 71 While Executive Order 13783 is briefly mentioned in the
court’s opinion, 72 it had no apparent impact on the court’s review of the agency’s
compliance with NEPA.
More recent cases suggest that the Trump Administration’s efforts to
streamline NEPA processes by rescinding key guidance and protocols, such as
those relating to climate change, may backfire. For example, in Wild Earth
Guardians v. Bernhardt, the court expressly considered the effects of Executive
Order 13783 on the agency’s NEPA obligations. 73 The court held that the
Bureau of Land Management failed to take the required “hard look” under
64. Exec. Order No. 13,766, 82 Fed. Reg. 8657 (Jan. 30, 2017).
65. See Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,094 (Mar. 31, 2017); Exec. Order
No. 13,087, 82 Fed. Reg. 40,463, 40,466 (Aug. 24, 2017).
66. 82 Fed. Reg. at 16,094.
67. Id. at 16,095.
68. See, e.g., id. at 16096.
69. For a short summary, see Christy Goldfuss et al., 12 Climate Wins From the National
Environmental Policy Act, (May 29, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news
/2019/05/29/470374/12-climate-wins-national-environmental-policy-act/.
70. 867 F.3d 1357, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
71. Id. at 1375.
72. Id.
73. Wild Earth Guardians v. Bernhardt, No. CV 17-80-BLG-SPW, 2021 WL 363955, at *9
(D. Mont. Feb. 3, 2021).
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NEPA at the costs of the greenhouse gas emissions associated with its granting
of a coal mining lease, and, additionally, failed to adequately explain why it
refused to quantify those costs. 74 In addressing the executive order, the court
held:
Federal agencies cannot ignore more accurate scientific information when it is
available. . . . While Executive Order No. 13783 withdrew the technical
support documents for [social cost of carbon protocol], it did not change the
nature of the scientific information forming the basis for the Protocol. California
v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d 573, 611 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2020) (“In other
words, the President did not alter by fiat what constitutes the best available
science. The Executive Order in and of itself has no legal impact on the
consensus that IWG’s estimates constitute the best available science about
monetizing the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions.”). Thus, the [social cost of
carbon protocol] remains a viable model tool for monetizing the costs of
greenhouse gas emissions despite Executive Order No. 13783. 75

The court’s decision in Wild Earth Guardians makes clear that the executive
orders do not relieve agencies of their NEPA responsibilities to evaluate the
environmental impacts of their actions, even if those impacts may be difficult to
assess and quantify, such as climate change impacts. 76 While the prior guidance
was not legally binding on agencies, it may have provided a normalizing and
acceptable method to reduce the vagaries of and opportunities for litigation
involving agencies’ responsibility to comply with NEPA mandates. By
rescinding previous guidance about how agencies may comply with that
responsibility, the Trump executive orders may inadvertently have provided new
opportunities for litigating these issues in court, which of course may delay the
implementation of proposed agency actions. 77
I also focused on the efforts by the Trump CEQ to engage in a
comprehensive review of its 1978 NEPA implementing regulations, which were
prompted in part by Executive Order 13087. CEQ issued a final rule adopting
significant revisions on July 16, 2020. 78 The key features of the regulations
included:

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at *8.
Id. at *9–10.
Id. at *10.
See Sharon Buccino, Understanding Trump’s Harmful Attack on NEPA, NAT. RES. DEF.
COUNCIL (July 15, 2020), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/sharon-buccino/understanding-trumpsharmful-attack-nepa (explaining that “[o]ne irony of the Trump administration’s regulatory attack
on NEPA is that while it’s aimed at fast-tracking approvals for pipelines, coal mines, and oil
drilling, it’s actually going to lead to more of a legal mess that will slow down all kinds of
projects.”).
78. 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304 (July 16, 2020).
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• Reversing decades of precedent and assigning independent significance
to the term “major” in determining whether a proposed agency action
requires the preparation of an EIS 79
• Expanding the (already widespread) use of categorical exclusions
(“CEs”) by allowing agencies to use CEs even in some “extraordinary
circumstances” 80
• Eliminating the requirement for agencies to consider cumulative and
indirect impacts when making judgments about CEs and findings of no
significant impacts, as well as in preparing EISs 81
• Narrowing the range of alternatives to a proposed action that an agency
must consider 82
• Placing time limits (generally two years for an EIS and one year for an
EA) and page limits on EISs (generally 150 pages or, for “proposals of
unusual scope or complexity,” 300 pages) 83
• Including restrictive provisions designed to reduce or limit opportunities
for litigation and/or remedies for NEPA noncompliance 84
While each one of these categories of revisions may hamper the goals of
transparency, public participation, and agency accountability, perhaps the most
79. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.1(q). The 1978 CEQ regulations provided that the term “Major reinforces
but does not have a meaning independent of significantly.” See 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,989 (Nov.
29, 1978) (explaining that “[t]he Council determined that any Federal action which significantly
affects the quality of the human environment is ‘major’ for purposes of NEPA”); see also City of
Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 n.15 (9th Cir. 1975) (giving the term “major” independent
significance “does little to foster the purposes of [NEPA]”).
80. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b)(1).
81. See 85 Fed. Reg. at 43,343–44 (discussing “cumulative” and “indirect” effects). The 1978
regulations required agencies to consider direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts. 40 C.F.R. §
1508.25(c) (2018). Cumulative impact was defined as “the impact on the environment which results
from the incremental impact of the action when added to past, present, and reasonably foreseeable
future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other
actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions
taking place over a period of time.” Id. 1508.7.
82. The 1978 regulations stated that the alternatives analysis “is the heart of the environmental
impact statement.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2018). The old regulations also included a requirement
that EISs “[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives,” id. §
1502.14(a), and “include reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdiction of the lead agency.” Id.
§ 1502.14(c). These provisions have been eliminated in the new regulations. As if to underscore
the departure from the previous regulations, the Trump CEQ revisions include a requirement that
agencies “[l]imit their consideration to a reasonable number of alternatives.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(f)
(2021).
83. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.10(b)(1)–(2), 1502.7.
84. See id. §§ 1500.3(b) (exhaustion requirement), 1500.3(c) (authorizing agencies to require
posting of bond), 1500.3(d) (no presumption that injunctive relief is appropriate for NEPA
violations and harmless error rule), 1503.3(b) (exhaustion).
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significant revision relates to the elimination of an explicit requirement for EISs
to include a discussion of a proposed project’s cumulative and indirect
environmental impacts. The new regulations define “effects” or “impacts” as
“changes to the human environment from the proposed action or alternatives that
are reasonably foreseeable and have a reasonably close causal relationship to the
proposed action or alternatives . . . .” 85 Additionally, the new regulations also
provide that “[a] ‘but for’ causal relationship is insufficient to make an agency
responsible for a particular effect under NEPA. Effects should generally not be
considered if they are remote in time, geographically remote, or the product of
a lengthy causal chain.” 86 And in another departure from the 1978 rules, the new
rules provide that “[e]ffects do not include those effects that the agency has no
ability to prevent due to its limited statutory authority or would occur regardless
of the proposed action.” 87
The rather clear target of these revisions is the agency’s obligation to
consider a proposed action’s effect on greenhouse gas emissions and global
climate change. As Professors Glicksman and Camacho have concluded,
There is little doubt that both the intention and effect of these revisions would
be to minimize agency responsibilities to consider climate change, given the
complexity of the causal chains between some human activities and the resulting
climate effects, and the length of time it may take for climate effects to
manifest. 88

Relatedly, the Trump CEQ had earlier issued draft guidance to agencies on how
to consider greenhouse gas emissions in their NEPA reviews. 89 This guidance
replaces and weakens Obama-era guidance, which, as noted above, CEQ was
directed to rescind by President Trump’s Executive Order 13783.
One of the primary difficulties that teachers of environmental law may have
in addressing the CEQ revisions relates to their potential longevity or impact on
NEPA litigation. Whether the courts will accept these revisions as consistent
with the statute and not arbitrary and capricious remains to be seen. It may be
that the courts will dismiss present challenges in light of Biden Administration
actions. 90 The Biden CEQ has rescinded the draft guidance on greenhouse gas
emissions and is currently reconsidering the Trump revisions to the NEPA
regulations. 91 It has asked a federal court to remand without vacating the
challenged regulations as the agency reconsiders them. 92
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. § 1508.1(g).
Id. § 1508.1(g)(2).
Id.
Glicksman & Camacho, supra note 37, at 10285.
84 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (June 26, 2019).
The CEQ revised regulations have been challenged in four separate lawsuits. See REG.
TRACKER, supra note 10.
91. See id.
92. Id.
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The Vagaries of Cooperative Federalism: Trump & the Clean Water Act

One of the common features of the major federal environmental programs,
like the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), is a commitment to “cooperative
federalism.” 93 In the CWA, for example, Congress declared a goal to “restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.” 94 At the same time, Congress deemed it a national policy to “recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities of States to prevent, reduce,
and eliminate pollution [and] to plan the development and use . . . of land and
water resources . . . .” 95 The role of the States in controlling water pollution and
protecting water quality depends both on the responsibilities States may assume
under the CWA and the jurisdictional limits placed on federal agencies in terms
of the waters they may protect and the activities they may regulate. In the
absence of federal jurisdiction, the quality of waters will depend on the
willingness of States to regulate polluting activities, the efficacy of any efforts
they may undertake to do so, and the extent to which State authority is preempted
by federal legislation or regulatory action. 96
The Trump Administration promulgated two rules that address the
cooperative federalism approach of the CWA, including concerns about
preserving the States’ role in controlling water pollution. The first rule, known
as the Navigable Waters Protection Rule, addresses the scope of EPA’s and the
Army Corps of Engineers’ (“Corps”) jurisdiction over “navigable waters” under
the CWA. 97 The second rule addresses the States’ authority to impose conditions
on federal licenses and permits to protect water resources within their respective
jurisdictions. 98 Together, these rules paint a vague and inconsistent view of the
CWA’s cooperative federalism structure.

93. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992) (“The Clean Water Act
anticipates a partnership between the States and the Federal Government, animated by a shared
objective: ‘to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.’”) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)); Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 792 F.3d
281, 288 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Under [the Clean Water Act], the EPA and the states participate in a
‘cooperative federalism’ framework working together to clean the Nation’s waters.”); see Robert
V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1147, 1174–76 (1995) (describing cooperative federalism model in environmental law).
94. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
95. Id. § 1251(b).
96. For a discussion of cooperative federalism in the Clean Water Act, see Douglas R.
Williams, Toward Regional Governance in Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 1047, 1064–
69 (2013).
97. 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020).
98. 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020).
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The Scope of the CWA’s Jurisdiction over “Navigable Waters”

The key jurisdictional limitations on federal authority can be gleaned from
Section 301 of the CWA, which declares that “the discharge of any pollutant by
any person shall be unlawful,” unless the discharge meets the requirements of
various provisions of the CWA, including a requirement to obtain a discharge
permit. 99 The CWA defines the term “discharge of a pollutant” to include only
discharges that add pollutants from “point sources” into “navigable waters.” 100
Thus, for federal jurisdiction to attach, the polluting activity must be a point
source discharge, must add pollutants, and must be into a navigable water.
Polluting activities such as non-point source pollution, including urban and
agricultural runoff, and all discharges into waters deemed not to be “navigable,”
may be regulated, if at all, only by the States, though there are provisions in the
CWA that provide incentives for the States to address these problems. 101
Additionally, the CWA gives the States primary authority to promulgate water
quality standards, including the designated uses of water resources and criteria
to ensure those uses are protected. 102 States may also administer a permitting
program within their respective States, so long as the program meets minimum
federal standards; otherwise EPA is charged with administering the permit
program. 103 The CWA also provides that applicants for federal licenses and
permits for activities that may result in a discharge into navigable waters must
obtain a certification from the relevant State that the discharge will comply with
various provisions of the CWA, including water quality standards, and “any
other appropriate requirement of State law.” 104
The CWA’s key geographic jurisdictional term, “navigable waters,” has
been notoriously controversial. 105 Congress, rather unhelpfully, defined
“navigable waters” as “waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas.” 106 The Supreme Court has addressed the scope of this jurisdictional term
repeatedly, but the most important decisions by the Court are United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, 107 Solid Waste Agency of the Northern Cook County

99. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
100. Id. § 1362(12).
101. Id. § 1329.
102. Id. § 1313(a)(3).
103. Id. § 1342(b).
104. Id. § 1341(d).
105. See generally Killing WOTUS, supra note 20; Erin Ryan, Federalism, Regulatory
Architecture, and the Clean Water Rule: Seeking Consensus on the Waters of the United States, 46
ENV’T L. 277 (2016); Jeffrey G. Miller, Plain Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting
the “Navigable Waters” Element of the Clean Water Act Offense, 45 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10548 (2015).
106. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
107. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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v. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), 108 and Rapanos v. United States. 109
Likewise, EPA and the Corps, which share key and respectively distinctive roles
under the CWA, have jointly promulgated various definitions of “waters of the
United States” (“WOTUS”) over the years. Their efforts during the Trump
Administration included a series of actions to delay the implementation of a
2015 rule and, eventually, a new rule dramatically narrowing the scope of the
CWA’s jurisdiction from what it was under the 2015 Obama Administration
rule. 110
Most of the class time I devote to discussing the CWA’s geographic
jurisdiction focuses on the three Supreme Court cases mentioned above. The
combined effect of the Court’s decisions in Riverside Bayview Homes,
SWANCC, and Rapanos has been growing uncertainty both about which
“waters” fall within the jurisdiction of the CWA, as well as the amount of
deference the courts should extend to EPA’s and the Corps’ efforts to draw the
regulatory boundaries.
In Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court confronted the issue of whether the
CWA’s jurisdiction extended to wetlands determined by the Corps to be
“adjacent” to a navigable body of water—in this case, Lake St. Clair in
Michigan—and thus, a “water of the United States” under then-existing
regulations. The Court agreed with the Corps that the wetlands in question were
“adjacent” within the meaning of the regulations. 111 It then considered whether
the CWA permitted the Corps to extend its jurisdiction to such wetlands. In
considering that question, the Court first noted that “an agency’s construction of
a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference if it is reasonable
and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress.” 112 Applying this
standard, the Court held that including adjacent wetlands in the definition of
“waters of the United States” was a reasonable interpretation of the CWA. 113
The Court noted that, given “the breadth of federal regulatory authority” under
the CWA and the “inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable
waters, the Corps’ ecological judgment about the relationship between waters
and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that
adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the [CWA].” 114
108. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
109. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
110. The Trump-era rule, known as the “Navigable Waters Protection Rule,” was published in
the Federal Register on April 21, 2020. 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020). The Obama-era rule,
known as the “Clean Water Rule,” was promulgated in June 2015. 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29,
2015). The complicated history of the Clean Water Rule and the Navigable Waters Protection Rule
is detailed in REG. TRACKER, supra note 10.
111. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 130–31.
112. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).
113. Id. at 134–35.
114. Id. at 134.
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Riverside Bayview Homes thus suggests that courts should defer to the
Corps’ efforts to mark the boundaries of its jurisdiction under the CWA so long
as the basis for its decisions implicates a reasonable “ecological” judgment about
the relationship between the waters in question and traditional “navigable”
waters. This suggestion is further supported by the Court’s conclusion in
Riverside Bayview Homes that CWA jurisdiction over “adjacent” wetlands could
properly attach “even when the moisture creating the wetlands does not find its
source in the adjacent bodies of water.” 115 This is because the Corps could
reasonably conclude that such wetlands “may function as integral parts of the
aquatic environment,” performing such services as improving water quality,
containing surface runoff, preventing or limiting flooding, and providing food
and habitat for a variety of aquatic species. 116 In another important conclusion,
the Court concluded that the Corps may regulate all such adjacent wetlands, even
in those instances in which the wetlands “are not significantly intertwined with
the ecosystem of adjacent waterways” because “the existence of such cases does
not seriously undermine the Corps’ decision to define all adjacent wetlands as
‘waters.’” 117 In the Court’s view, when the Corps does encounter such a wetland,
it may “always allow development . . . for other uses simply by issuing a
permit.” 118
In SWANCC, the Court rejected the Corps’ efforts to assert jurisdiction over
an abandoned gravel pit that, over time, evolved into a series of seasonal and
permanent ponds ranging in size from under one-tenth of an acre to several acres.
The Corps premised its jurisdiction over these waters on the basis that they
served as habitat for hundreds of migratory birds and a regulation that defined
waters of the United States to include “waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams . . . , mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet
meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of
which could affect interstate or foreign commerce.” 119 In the preamble to that
regulation, the Corps (and EPA) had stated that the CWA’s jurisdiction extended
to intrastate waters used as habitat for migratory birds. 120 This statement became
known as the “Migratory Bird Rule.” 121
The Court refused to defer to the Corps’ interpretation of the statute.
Concluding that the statute was “clear,” 122 the Court went on to apply the
avoidance canon, noting that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a
115. Id. at 135.
116. Id. at 134–35.
117. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 135 n.9 (1985).
118. Id.
119. Solid Waste Agency of the Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S.
159, 163 (2001) (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1999)).
120. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217.
121. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164.
122. Id. at 172.
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statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such a construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress.” 123 It concluded that the Corps application of the statute
to the waters in question raised “significant constitutional questions” about the
reach of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. It therefore held that
the “Migratory Bird Rule” exceeded the Corps authority under the CWA.
The Court distinguished Riverside Bayview Homes, concluding that “[i]t
was the significant nexus between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’” that
rendered the Corps’ jurisdiction in that case appropriate. 124 By contrast, to
support the Corps’ jurisdiction over the waters in SWANCC, the Court would
have to “assume that ‘the use of the word navigable in the statute . . . does not
have any independent significance,’” which the Court was unprepared to do. 125
Thus, even though Riverside Bayview Homes had concluded that the term
“navigable” in the CWA was of “limited import,” 126 for the Court in this case,
“navigable” made clear that “nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters” were not
to be considered “waters of the United States.” 127
SWANCC also introduced another set of concerns about the scope of CWA
jurisdiction not raised in Riverside Bayview Homes. As mentioned above,
SWANCC expressed doubts about whether Congress wanted to test the limits of
its Commerce Clause authority in the CWA and chose to avoid a construction of
the act that would force the Court to address those limits. This concern was also
tied in SWANCC to the Court’s then-resurgent “federalism” jurisprudence,
echoing concerns expressed in other cases about congressional efforts to
diminish and intrude into areas of “traditional State concern.” 128 Thus, the Court
reasoned that “[p]ermitting [the Corps] to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds
and mudflats falling within the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ would result in a
significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over land
and water use.” 129
SWANCC and Riverside Bayview Homes differ significantly in both tone
and reasoning, and the cases left EPA and the Corps—and just about everyone
123. Id. at 173 (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
124. Solid Waste Agency of the Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S.
159, 167 (2001).
125. Id. at 172.
126. Id. at 172 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 133(1985)).
127. Id.
128. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615–16 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 564–65 (1995). For a discussion of how concerns about state authority and federalism
influenced the Rehnquist Court, see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 1763, 1769–87 (2006) and Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2004).
129. Solid Waste Agency of the Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S.
159, 174 (2001).
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else—in considerable doubt about the extent of CWA’s jurisdiction. 130 The
Court’s decision in Rapanos did little to clarify the reigning uncertainty and, in
fact, significantly exacerbated it.
Rapanos was decided by a badly fractured Court, with a concurring opinion
by Justice Kennedy providing the key deciding vote. 131 Justice Kennedy did not
join a four-Justice plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia. The plurality
concluded that under the CWA, the Corps could exercise jurisdiction over
wetlands only if the Corps could establish that the wetlands “have a continuous
surface connection” with “a relatively permanent body of water connected to
traditional interstate navigable waters.” 132 Justice Kennedy sharply disagreed
with Justice Scalia’s reasoning, but agreed with the plurality that a remand was
appropriate because the Corps had not established a “significant nexus” between
the wetlands in question and “navigable waters in the traditional sense.” 133 Four
Justices dissented, and applying Chevron, concluded that the Corps’ could
reasonably interpret “waters of the United States” to include wetlands adjacent
to a tributary of traditional navigable waters, such as the wetlands at issue in the
case. 134
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion relied heavily on a dictionary definition of
waters to conclude that only “relatively permanent, standing or continuously
flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic features’ that are described in
ordinary parlance as ‘streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes’” could be
considered “waters of the United States.” 135 As for wetlands, Justice Scalia
acknowledged that they could be considered “waters of the United States” under
Riverside Bayview Homes, but he interpreted that case to permit jurisdiction only
in those circumstances in which there was “ambiguity in defining where water
ends and abutting (‘adjacent’) wetlands begin.” 136 It was this ambiguity that, in
Justice Scalia’s view, informed SWANCC’s idea of a “significant nexus
between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters.’” 137 Indeed, Justice Scalia read
SWANCC as “reject[ing] the notion that the ecological considerations upon
130. In the wake of SWANCC, the agencies made some effort to initiate a rulemaking to clarify
and redefine “waters of the United States,” but eventually abandoned that effort. Instead, the
agencies issued “interim guidance” that required field offices to seek guidance from the Corps’
headquarters before asserting jurisdiction over any isolated, non-navigable water. See LEGAL
PROTECTION, supra note 3, at 200–01.
131. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
132. Id. at 742 (plurality opinion).
133. Id. at 779, 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Corps’ . . . decision to treat these wetlands as
encompassed within the term ‘waters of the United States’ is a quintessential example of the
Executive’s reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision.”).
135. Id. at 739 (plurality opinion) (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary 2882 (2d
ed. 1954)).
136. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006).
137. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2022]

TEACHING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER TRUMP

491

which the Corps relied in Riverside Bayview . . . provided an independent basis
for including entities like ‘wetlands’ (or “ephemeral streams”) within the phrase
‘the waters of the United States.’” 138 Accordingly, “only those wetlands with a
continuous surface connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’ in
their own right, so [] there is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and
wetlands, are ‘adjacent to’ such waters and covered by the Act.” 139
Like Chief Justice Rehnquist in SWANCC, Justice Scalia placed
considerable emphasis on federalism concerns he believed were implicated by
the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction in Rapanos. He concluded that deference to
the Corps’ interpretation of the CWA was inappropriate because the statute was
clear, and for two additional reasons: (1) affirming the Corps’ jurisdiction
“would ‘result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary
power over land and water use;’” 140 and (2) the Corps’ interpretation would raise
significant constitutional questions about the scope of Congress’s powers under
the Commerce Clause. 141
Justice Kennedy, disagreeing with the plurality, interpreted the “significance
nexus” theory in SWANCC as referring to ecological connections between
wetlands and other waters. He therefore concluded that “wetlands possess the
requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase ‘navigable waters,’ if
the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the
region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
other waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’” 142 In terms of the Corps’
regulatory authority, Justice Kennedy concluded that “[w]hen the Corps seeks
to regulate wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, it may rely on
adjacency to establish its jurisdiction. Absent more specific regulations,
however, the Corps must establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case basis
when it seeks to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to nonnavigable
tributaries.” 143 He added that the Corps could issue regulations that,
[I]dentify categories of tributaries that, due to their volume of flow . . . , their
proximity to navigable waters, or other relevant considerations, are significant
enough that wetlands adjacent to them are likely, in the majority of cases, to
perform important functions for an aquatic system incorporating navigable
waters. 144

138. Id. at 741.
139. Id. at 742.
140. Id. at 738 (quoting Solid Waste Agency of the Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001)).
141. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006).
142. Id. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 782.
144. Id. at 781.
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In Justice Kennedy’s view, his interpretation “does not raise federalism or
Commerce Clause concerns sufficient to support a presumption against its
adoption.” 145
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion bemoaning the Corps’
failure to promulgate more tailored regulations in the wake of the SWANCC
decision. 146 He noted that under Chevron, and “[g]iven the broad, somewhat
ambiguous, but nonetheless clearly limiting terms Congress employed in the
Clean Water Act, the Corps and EPA would have enjoyed plenty of room to
operate in developing some notion of an outer bound to the reach of their
authority.” 147
Finally, the four dissenters concluded that the Corps’ assumption of
jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters was based
on appropriate ecological concerns consistent with the CWA and was owed
deference, as in Riverside Bayview Homes. 148 The dissenters also rejected the
idea that federalism or constitutional considerations could appropriately
override the deference owed by the Court to the Corps’ interpretation of the
CWA. 149
Eventually, EPA and the Corps would take up Chief Justice Roberts’
suggestion and revise its regulations defining “waters of the United States.” The
result was the 2015 Obama Administration Clean Water Rule. 150 At the center
of this new rule was the “significant nexus” standard advanced by Justice
Kennedy in Rapanos. 151 The Trump Administration went through a series of
rulemakings 152 and eventually replaced the Clean Water Rule with the
Navigable Waters Protection Rule. 153 This time, the “significant nexus”
standard, as articulated by Justice Kennedy, was jettisoned in favor of the
approach outlined in Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos, as President
Trump suggested in Executive Order 13778. 154 This is an approach followed by
none of courts of appeals that decided cases in the wake of Rapanos. 155
145. Id. at 782.
146. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 757–58 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
147. Id. at 758.
148. Id. at 788, 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 803–04.
150. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015).
151. Id. at 37,061 (“[EPA and the Corps] utilize the significant nexus standard, as articulated
by Justice Kennedy’s opinion and informed by the unanimous opinion in Riverside Bayview and
the plurality opinion in Rapanos . . . to interpret the scope of the statutory term ‘waters of the United
States.’”).
152. See Killing WOTUS, supra note 20, at 399–402 (describing the Trump administration’s
rulemaking process).
153. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020).
154. See id. at 22,273.
155. See N. Cal. River Watch v. Wilcox, 633 F.3d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying the
Kennedy test); Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 2011)
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The primary regulatory differences between the 2015 Clean Water Rule and
the Navigable Waters Protection Rule lie in the way two key terms are defined:
“tributaries” and “adjacent” waters, including wetlands. 156 The Navigable
Waters Protection Rule eliminates jurisdiction over a significant number of
streams and wetlands that would have fallen within EPA’s and the Corps’
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Rule. 157 These regulatory differences were
fueled in part by very large differences in the Trump and Obama agencies’
understandings of the role of federalism and the States under the CWA.
In fashioning the Navigable Waters Protection Rule, EPA and the Corps
relied heavily on the federalism concerns expressed by the Court in SWANCC
and by Justice Scalia in Rapanos. 158 In addition, however, the agencies adopted
an interpretation of the CWA that treats federal efforts to achieve the CWA’s
objective of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the physical, chemical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters” 159 to be limited by Section 101(b) of
the CWA’s “policy” “to recognize, preserve and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution
. . . and to plan the development and use . . . of land and water resources.” 160 As
Professor Johnson has argued, this approach to statutory interpretation makes
critical errors, particularly in treating the “policy” as controlling the extent to
(same); United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 180 (3d. Cir. 2011) (holding that CWA
jurisdiction may be established under the Kennedy or Scalia test); United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d
791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 208 (6th Cir. 2009) (either
the Kennedy or Scalia test); United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 326–27 (same); United States v.
Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007) (Kennedy test); United States v. Gerke Excavating,
Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006) (Kennedy test); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66
(1st Cir. 2006) (Kennedy or Scalia test).
156. Under the Navigable Waters Protection Rule, tributaries must be “intermittent” or
“perennial.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,339. By contrast, the Clean Water Rule defined tributaries more
broadly to include even some ephemeral streams, so long as they are “characterized by the presence
of the physical indicators of a bed and banks and an ordinary high water mark.” 80 Fed. Reg. at
37,106. To be considered “adjacent” under the Navigable Waters Protection Rule, a wetland would
have to “abut” or have a “direct hydrologic connection” with other jurisdictional waters. See 85
Fed. Reg. at 22,307. By contrast, the Clean Water Rule defined “adjacent” broadly to include
wetlands “neighboring” other jurisdictional waters and defined “neighboring” to include wetlands
within one of three “distance thresholds.” See 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,080. For a more detailed
discussion of the differences in these rules, see Killing WOTUS, supra note 20, at 419–20; Adam
S. Ward & Riley Walsh, New Clean Water Act Rule Leaves U.S. Waters Vulnerable, EOS (Feb. 11,
2020), https://eos.org/opinions/new-clean-water-act-rule-leaves-u-s-waters-vulnerable.
157. See, e.g., Evan Richards, Debunking the Trump Administration’s New Water Rule, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2019
/03/27/467697/debunking-trump-administrations-new-water-rule/ (noting that the rule would
eliminate jurisdiction over eighteen percent of stream and river miles and fifty-one percent of
wetlands); see also Killing WOTUS, supra note 20, at 421.
158. See, e.g., Navigable Waters Protection Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250, 22,253 (Apr. 21, 2020).
159. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
160. Id. § 1251(b).
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which a statute’s objective may be pursued. 161 An appropriate interpretation
would recognize that if the CWA’s objectives can be met in different ways, some
of which intrude upon the authority of the States and others that do not, the
agencies should select the approach that does not intrude upon State authority.
What the agencies should not do, as EPA and the Corps did in the Navigable
Waters Protection Rule, is “to advance states’ rights when it interferes with
achieving the objectives of the statute.” 162
While it is impractical to explore the federalism issues raised by the Court
in SWANCC and Rapanos and by the agencies in the Navigable Waters
Protection Rule in any depth in an environmental law course, students must
understand that these issues are likely to continue to inform the agencies’ and
the Court’s interpretation of the CWA, particularly the term “waters of the
United States.” But it is also important to highlight how federalism concerns
may be malleable and vary across the different regulatory authorities included
in the CWA. In other words, in other CWA programs, the agencies may not be
as inclined to protect “the States’ traditional and primary power over land and
water use” as they were in the Navigable Waters Protection Rule. One of those
programs is Section 401, a certification procedure that the Trump
Administration targeted as an impediment to infrastructure and other projects
that require a federal license or permit. To highlight differences in how
federalism impacts the agencies’ regulatory approaches in the CWA, I spend
some time exploring the Section 401 program and contrast it with how “waters
of the United States” has been interpreted.
2.

Section 401 State Certification & the Trump Administration’s
Narrowing of State Authority

In contrast to the rather explicit effort to expand the States’ role under the
CWA in the Navigable Waters Protection Rule (by limiting federal jurisdiction),
the Trump EPA rather doggedly limited State authority in another rulemaking—
this under Section 401 of the CWA which governs state certification of federal
permits and licenses. 163
Section 401 requires any applicant for a “Federal license or permit . . . which
may result in any discharge into the navigable waters . . . [to] provide the
licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State in which the
discharge originates or will originate . . . that any such discharge will comply”
with various provisions of the CWA, including those requiring discharges to
comply with approved state water quality standards. 164 In performing its
certification responsibilities, a State may impose requirements to ensure that the
161.
162.
163.
164.

See Killing WOTUS, supra note 20, at 423–25.
Id. at 425.
See Navigable Waters Protection Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250, 22,254 (Apr. 21, 2020).
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
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applicant for the permit or license will comply with various limitations imposed
by the CWA “and with any other appropriate requirement of State law.” 165 The
requirements imposed by the certifying State then become conditions on the
federal license or permit, 166 and the federal agency administering the permit or
license program may not issue the license or permit without including these
conditions. 167 Moreover, the relevant federal agency lacks authority to review
state-imposed conditions to determine whether those conditions are properly
within the State’s authority under Section 401. 168
The Supreme Court has addressed several important issues under Section
401 and has consistently interpreted the States’ certification authority broadly.
The key issues addressed by the Court include Section 401’s triggering
mechanism for State certification—namely, a “discharge into navigable
waters”—and the scope of State authority once certification has been triggered.
More recently, the courts of appeals have addressed another important issue
under Section 401—how the time and waiver provisions of Section 401 limit
State certification authority. The Trump EPA addressed these issues (and more)
in a rulemaking that revisited the States’ Section 401 authority and procedures
for the first time since 1971. In doing so, the agency acted in ways that
dramatically alter the legal landscape under Section 401 and significantly reduce
the States’ role in that program.
In S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. Of Environmental Protection, 169 the Court
entertained a challenge to a state certification involving the renewal of a license
from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to operate a dam as
a hydroelectric facility. The state certifying authority required the applicant to
maintain a minimum stream flow in bypassed portions of the river on which the
dam was constructed, as well as other measures protective of migratory fish, and
FERC imposed these requirements as conditions on the license renewal. The
applicant for the license claimed that because the dam’s discharges did not
involve the “addition” of any pollutants that were not already present in the
affected waters, . . . no regulable “discharge” would result from the project and,
thus, no certification was required. 170 In essence, this argument interprets the
term “discharge” in Section 401 to be coterminous with the term “discharge of
a pollutant,” which governs the CWA’s Section 402 permit program. 171
165. Id. § 1341(d).
166. Id.
167. Keating v. FERC, 927 F.2d 616, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
168. American Rivers, Inc. v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 1997); see, e.g., Debra L.
Donahue, The Untapped Power of Clean Water Act Section 401, 23 ECOLOGY L. Q. 201, 258–59
(1996) (discussing agency authority to review state conditions).
169. 547 U.S. 370 (2006).
170. Id. at 379.
171. Cases decided under Section 402 hold that a typical discharge from a dam is not a
“discharge of a pollutant” because the discharge does not “add” any pollutants to the relevant
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The Court rejected the applicant’s argument. It held that the term
“discharge,” though not defined in the CWA, is broader than “discharge of a
pollutant,” which as mentioned above, is defined in the CWA and requires the
addition of a pollutant from a point source. 172 Giving the statutory term its
“ordinary or natural meaning,” 173 the Court interpreted “discharge” to mean a
“flowing or issuing out” 174—an interpretation that supports the State’s
certification authority in this case. Importantly, the Court noted that “State
certifications under § 401 are essential in the scheme to preserve state authority
to address the broad range of pollution.” 175 Accordingly, “[c]hanges in the river
like [those at issue in the dam’s license renewal] fall within a State’s legitimate
legislative business, and the Clean Water Act provides for a system that respects
the States’ concerns.” 176
Despite the broad reading given the term “discharge” by the Court in S.D.
Warren, some lower courts have continued to interpret the term restrictively to
exclude nonpoint source discharges from the reach of Section 401. The leading
case is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Oregon Natural Desert Assoc. v. U.S.
Forest Service, in which the court held that grazing permits issued by the Forest
Service are not subject to the State certification procedure established in Section
401 by virtue of the nonpoint source water pollution generated by grazing
operations. 177 In adhering to a prior decision on the issue, the court of appeals
concluded that “[n]either the ruling nor the reasoning in S.D. Warren is
inconsistent with this court’s treatment of nonpoint sources in Section 401
. . . .” 178 In the court of appeals’ view, S.D. Warren itself involved a point source
discharge and could not be read to alter the court of appeals’ prior conclusion,
which rested on the CWA’s disparate treatment of nonpoint sources and point
sources. 179 As the court correctly noted, “the CWA generally does not exercise
jurisdiction over . . . nonpoint sources,” preferring instead to leave this pollution
problem to the State’s traditional authority to regulate land uses. 180 This is a
curious argument for denying State certification authority over nonpoint
sources, which if granted would permit the States to exercise at least some of
their traditional authority in the context of activities that may otherwise preempt

waters, as required by the CWA’s definition of the term. See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch,
693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
172. S.D. Warren, 547 U.S. at 375–76.
173. Id. at 376 (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994)).
174. S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. Of Environmental Protection, 547 U.S. 370 (2006) (quoting
WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 742 (2d ed.1954)).
175. Id. at 386.
176. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)).
177. 550 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2008).
178. Id. at 785.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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State authority 181 and to treat nonpoint source controls as an “appropriate
requirement of State law” pursuant to Section 401(d). The ruling also leaves a
potentially significant number of activities that contribute to pollution problems
in waters of the United States generally beyond the reach of State and federal
regulatory authority. 182
The restrictive decision in Oregon Natural Desert is also a bit at odds with
(but not necessarily inconsistent with) a more significant Supreme Court
decision—PUD No. 1 v. Washington Dep’t of Ecology. 183 In this case, as in S.D.
Warren, the Court entertained a challenge by an applicant for a hydroelectric
license from FERC. 184 The applicant had applied for state certification of the
project from the Washington Department of Ecology (“WDEC”). 185 The state
agency imposed minimum stream flow requirements in its certification, to which
the applicant objected. 186 The applicant argued that the minimum stream flow
requirements exceeded WDEC’s authority under Section 401 for two reasons:
(1) the requirements were unrelated to the discharges that triggered the State’s
authority under Section 401 and, therefore, not authorized by the CWA; (2) the
minimum stream flow requirements were not a proper application of the State’s
water quality standards because the State had not applied specific water quality
criteria in imposing such a requirement, choosing instead to rely on use
designations and an antidegradation policy as bases for minimum stream
flows. 187
The Court rejected both arguments and upheld the minimum stream flow
requirements as a proper requirement imposed by the State under Section 401. 188
The Court first held that WDEC had authority to impose water quality
requirements on the project as a whole even if those requirements were unrelated
to the discharges that triggered the State’s authority under Section 401. 189 The
Court relied on Section 401(d), which authorizes a State to impose “‘any effluent
limitations and other limitations . . . necessary to assure that any applicant’ will
181. On the preemptive effect of federal licenses, see, e.g., California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490,
506 (1990) (holding that FERC license preempts State minimum stream flow requirements).
182. Some federal licensing and permitting agencies may have statutory authority to impose
pollution-reducing conditions on permits and licenses, so it may be possible for those agencies to
address nonpoint source pollution. For example, the Corps of Engineers issues permits for the
discharge of dredge and fill material into waters of the United States under Section 404 of the CWA.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). As part of this authority, the Corps conducts a wide-ranging environmental
review and may require mitigation measures to offset the harmful effects of the permitted activity.
To date, however, the agencies have shown no inclination to do so.
183. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 722 (1994).
184. Id. at 703.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 720.
188. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 720 (1994).
189. Id. at 722.
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comply with various provisions of the Act and appropriate state law
requirements.” 190 The Court reasoned that the reference to “any applicant,”
rather than to the discharges that trigger certification, is “most reasonably read
as authorizing additional conditions and limitations on the activity as a whole
once the threshold condition, the existence of a discharge, is satisfied.” 191 This
result will tend to ensure that the “applicant” and whole project is in compliance
with appropriate federal and state standards, as required by the language of
Section 401(d). 192 The Court added that its interpretation of Section 401(d)
followed EPA regulations implementing Section 401, and that EPA’s
interpretation was entitled to deference under Chevron. 193
The Court then considered whether the minimum stream flow requirements
were an appropriate condition under Section 401. 194 It held that they were. 195
States’ efforts to ensure compliance with state water quality standards is “a
proper function of § 401 certification.” 196 The Court noted that because water
quality standards under the CWA must include both use designations and water
quality criteria based on such uses, the CWA’s language is
[M]ost naturally read to require that a project be consistent with both
requirements, namely, the designated use and the water quality criteria. 197
Accordingly, under the literal terms of the statute, a project that does not comply
with a designated use of the water does not comply with the applicable water
quality standards. 198

Hence, WDEC could condition certification of the licensed activity to protect
the uses designated for waters under those standards; the State was not limited
to ensuring only that the standards’ water quality criteria were satisfied. 199 The
Court also concluded that because, absent conditions, the activity would
interfere with or injure existing beneficial uses of the affected waters, the
minimum stream flow requirements could be imposed pursuant to Section 401
under the State’s antidegradation policy. 200

190. Id. at 711.
191. Id. at 712.
192. Id. at 711.
193. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 712 (1994).
194. Id. at 715.
195. Id. at 713–14.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 715.
198. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 715 (1994).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 719. The state’s antidegradation policy is required by EPA regulations. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 131.12. As the Court noted, “EPA has explained that under its antidegradation policy, ‘no activity
is allowable . . . which could partially or completely eliminate any existing use.’” PUD No. 1, 511
U.S. at 718 (quoting EPA, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON ANTIDEGRADATION 3 (Aug. 1985)).
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Justice Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, which Justice Scalia joined.
Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority on the two key issues. First, Justice
Thomas would limit the states’ authority under Section 401 to address only the
water quality impacts of the discharges that trigger the states’ certification. In
his view, the majority’s holding that permitted the project as a whole to be
regulated undermined Congress’s decision to permit State involvement only
when there is discharge into navigable waters. 201 Second, Justice Thomas agreed
with the applicant that if a state chooses to enforce its water quality standards
through the Section 401 certification process, it may rely only on water quality
criteria; a state may not base its conditions solely on the beneficial uses to be
protected by its water quality standards. 202 In the dissenters’ view, permitting
states to base certification conditions on beneficial uses of waters effectively
removed any constraints on the states. 203
The broad authority States enjoy under the Supreme Court’s decisions in
S.D. Warren and PUD No.1 is, however, subject to waiver. Under the terms of
Section 401, “[i]f the State . . . fails or refuses to act on a request for certification,
within a reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed one year) after receipt
of such request, the certification requirements of this subsection shall be waived
with respect to such Federal application.” 204 Given the complexity of many
projects for which federal licenses and permits are needed, and the variety of
water quality effects these projects, the one-year time limit can sometimes be
challenging for state authorities. In some cases, the states reached agreements
with applicants that allowed the states to defer acting on certification requests
through a process of having the applicant withdraw and later resubmit the
certification request (sometimes repeatedly). The state would then claim that
each renewed submission started a new one-year (or “reasonable time”)
certification clock.
This withdrawal/resubmission process was challenged in Hoopa Valley
Tribe v. FERC. 205 In that case, the D.C. Circuit concluded that a “coordinated
withdrawal-and-resubmission scheme” 206 of the type described above could not
extend the statutory certification period beyond the one year maximum;
accordingly, the state, having failed to complete its certification within the
prescribed period of time, waived its certification authority. 207 Importantly, the
court noted that the resubmitted certification requests were not “new” requests
in the sense that they differed in content from previous ones. 208 It declined to
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 726–27.
Id. at 730.
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 731–32 (1994).
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
913 F.3d 1099, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Id.
Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1101.
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address whether a “new” request would restart the certification clock, or how
much different a submitted request must be from a previously submitted one to
be considered a truly “new” request. 209
In Executive Order 13,868, President Trump directed EPA to review and
propose revisions to the agency’s existing regulations governing Section 401
certifications, claiming that existing regulations “are causing confusion and
uncertainty and are hindering the development of energy infrastructure.” 210 In
response, EPA published final regulations on July 13, 2020. 211 The final rule
departs markedly from the Court’s decision in PUD No. 1 and dramatically
restricts the States’ authority under Section 401. The rule’s key provisions
include:
• Establishing that certification is required only when a project requiring a
federal license or permit may result in a discharge from a point source;
nonpoint sources discharges do not trigger the state certification
requirement. 212
• Employing “a holistic analysis of the text and structure of the CWA, the
language of section 401, and the amendments made between 1970 and
1972” to reject the Court’s interpretation in PUD No. 1 that would permit
states to impose conditions on the project as a whole, not just on the
discharges that trigger certification; 213 under the rule, “[t]he scope of a
Clean Water Act section 401 certification is limited to assuring that a
discharge from a Federally licensed or permitted activity will comply
with water quality requirements.” 214
• Relatedly, concluding that states may not impose conditions on projects
subject to certification to protect state waters (not considered navigable
waters under the CWA) from point and nonpoint source discharges from
the federally permitted or licensed activity. 215
• Concluding that the range of “water quality requirements” that may form
the basis for certification conditions is limited to applicable provisions
209. Id. at 1104.
210. Executive Order No. 13,868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,495, 15,496 (Apr. 15, 2019).
211. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule, 85
Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020). For my class, I asked students to work in groups to identify key
aspects of the Section 401 certification rulemaking and to prepare a PowerPoint presentation that
included their findings.
212. 40 C.F.R. § 121.1(f) (2021).
213. 85 Fed. Reg. at 42,233. The agency went to some length to explain why PUD. No. 1 does
not foreclose its narrower interpretation of State authority. See id. at 42,233–34. It justified the
narrower interpretation not on policy grounds, however; instead, it simply viewed the narrower
interpretation as “reasonable and the most appropriate reading of the statute and related legal
authorities.” Id. at 42,233.
214. 40 C.F.R. § 121.3 (2021).
215. 85 Fed. Reg. at 42,235.
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of the CWA and “state or tribal regulatory requirements for point source
discharges into waters of the United States.” 216
• Authorizing federal agencies to review state certifications and conditions
to ensure that they conform to the “procedural” requirements of the rule,
and creating a new, non-statutory basis for waivers of certification
authority if those requirements are not satisfied. 217
• Adhering to a strict interpretation of the time limits for certification,
concluding that the certification “clock does not toll for any reason,” 218
and prohibiting the states from requesting project proponents to
withdraw a certification request or to extend the certification period
without the approval of the relevant federal agency. 219
In making these changes to its existing rule, the Agency barely addressed
the federalism issues raised by several commenters, summarily concluding that
“the final rule does not infringe upon the roles of States as co-regulators, nor
does it undermine cooperative federalism.” 220 Unlike the Navigable Waters
Protection Rule, there is virtually no analysis from EPA explaining with
particularity how the new rule protects the States’ traditional authority over land
and water uses. Plainly, the rule diminishes that authority, at least with respect
to projects requiring federal permits or licenses. In fact, the new rule runs
counter to both the objectives—protecting the integrity of the nation’s waters—
and the policies—preserving traditional state authority—Congress articulated in
the CWA.
The two Trump Administration rulemakings, and their inconsistent
treatments of federalism issues under the CWA, leave many students (and
instructors) a bit bewildered about what role such federalism concerns should
play in the CWA’s various regulatory programs. The consistent theme of both
the Navigable Waters Protection Rule and the Section 401 Certification Rule is,
however, one of reducing regulatory barriers to infrastructure and development
projects, with little regard for the overall impact these rulemakings may have on
the quality of the nation’s water resources.
The two Trump rulemakings discussed in this Section have both been
challenged in numerous filings in the federal courts. 221 EPA and the Corps have
announced their intention to revise the Navigable Waters Protection Rule and to

216. 40 C.F.R. § 121.13.
217. Id. § 121.16.
218. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule, 85
Fed. Reg. 42,210, 42,262 (July 13, 2020).
219. 40 C.F.R. § 121.30.
220. 85 Fed. Reg. at 42,226.
221. For a list of the challenges to the Navigable Waters Protection Rule, see REG. TRACKER,
supra note 7. For challenges to the Section 401 certification rule, see 85 Fed. Reg. at 42,226.
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seek remands from the courts in which challenges to the rule have been raised. 222
It is very likely that neither of these rules will survive under the Biden
Administration. Accordingly, when teaching the CWA, these Trump
Administration rulemakings serve as examples of the volatile and partisan
character of environmental regulatory programs. They also provide an
opportunity to review the functioning of our overall legal system in the face of
dramatic regulatory changes not induced by legislative action.
C. Undoing the Obama Climate Change Program
The last, but perhaps most dramatic, of the Trump Administration’s attack
on environmental regulation I consider in my class relates to the control
emissions of pollutants—greenhouse gases (“GHGs”)—that contribute to global
climate change under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). The full extent of the Trump
Administration’s assault on the Obama Administration’s climate change
programs—both regulatory and nonregulatory, domestic and international—has
been discussed in other recent scholarship. 223 Here, I focus on two areas: rules
and practices restricting GHG emissions from new motor vehicles and the
Trump EPA’s efforts to repeal the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan.
The transportation sector accounts for the largest portion of the nation’s
overall GHG emissions. 224 In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA, 225 which rejected EPA’s efforts to eliminate the CAA as
a regulatory tool to address GHG emissions from motor vehicles, 226 the Obama
EPA took three important actions to address GHG emissions from new motor
222. See Press Release, Env’t Prot. Agency, Army Announce Intent to Revise Definition of
WOTUS (June 9, 2021), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-army-announce-intent-revisedefinition-wotus.
223. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 6; Nathan Richardson, The Rise and Fall of Clean Air Act
Climate Policy, 10 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 69 (2020); Cinnamon B. Carlarne, U.S. Climate
Change Law: A Decade of Flux and an Uncertain Future, 69 AM. U.L. REV. 387 (2019); Melissa
Powers, Zero-Sum Climate and Energy Politics Under the Trump Administration, 49 ENV’T L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10870 (2019); Brigham Daniels, Come Hell or High Water: Climate Change
Policy in the Age of Trump, 13 FIU L. REV. 65 (2018); Albert C. Lin, President Trump’s War on
Regulatory Science, 43 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 247 (2019). For more popular accounts, see
Alejandra Borunda, The most consequential impact of Trump’s climate policies? Wasted time,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/
most-consequential-impact-of-trumps-climate-policies-wasted-time; Zack Colman & Alec
Guillen, Trump’s Climate Change Rollbacks to Drive up U.S. Emissions, Climate Change
Rollbacks, POLITICO (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/17/trump-climaterollbacks-increase-emissions-417311.
224. See ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, SOURCES OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, https://www.epa
.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).
225. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
226. In Massachusetts, EPA argued that greenhouse gases did not qualify as “air pollutants”
under the CAA and, therefore, could not be regulated under that statute. The Court rejected that
argument, concluding that “[t]he statutory text forecloses EPA’s reading.” Id. at 528.
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vehicles. First, the Agency made an “endangerment finding” 227 in which it
concluded that GHG emissions from new motor vehicles “cause, or contribute
to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare” within the meaning of Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA. 228 Second, in
concert with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”)
acting under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”), 229 EPA issued
standards that would dramatically reduce emissions from new light duty motor
vehicles. 230 The motor vehicle standards would require reductions of
approximately five percent per year, yielding a cumulative reduction in GHG
emissions equivalent to two billion metric tons through 2025. 231 Effectively, the
standards would require light duty vehicles to achieve average fuel economy of
approximately fifty miles per gallon of gasoline. 232 Finally, the Obama EPA,
pursuant to Section 209(b) of the CAA, 233 granted waivers of preemption for
California’s GHG and zero emissions vehicle standards, 234 enabling California
and other states to adopt more stringent motor vehicle standards than those
required under federal law. 235
EPA’s endangerment finding set in motion additional regulatory efforts by
the Obama EPA to address GHG emissions under the CAA. Most of those efforts
related to controlling GHG emissions from stationary sources. First, because
GHGs had become “regulated pollutants” by virtue of the motor vehicle
emission standards, the Agency attempted to treat new and modified stationary
sources of GHG emissions as “major” sources under the CAA’s Prevention of
Significant Deterioration, which would subject those sources to permitting and

227. 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
229. NHTSA has statutory responsibility for promulgating Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFÉ) standards under EPCA. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a). In Massachusetts, the Court rejected
EPA’s argument that it could not regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles because such
regulation would inevitably tighten fuel economy standards—which are governed by NHTSA’s
CAFÉ standards under the EPCA. The court noted, “that [NHTSA acting for] DOT sets mileage
standards in no way licenses EPA to shirk its environmental responsibilities,” adding that “there is
no reason to think [NHTSA and EPA] cannot both administer their obligations and yet avoid
inconsistency.” 549 U.S. at 532.
230. 77 Fed. Reg. 62,623 (Oct. 12, 2012).
231. Id. at 62,627.
232. See id. (noting the standards will achieve the equivalent of 54.5 miles per gallon).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b). Under this statutory provision, EPA is directed to grant California a
waiver of preemption if the State’s standards are “at least as protective of public health and welfare
as applicable Federal standards,” unless EPA finds that the State’s standards are “arbitrary and
capricious,” unnecessary “to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions,” or “are not consistent
with [Section 202(a)] of the CAA].”
234. 78 Fed. Reg. 2111 (Jan. 9, 2013).
235. See 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (authorizing other states to adopt California motor vehicle standards
under certain conditions).
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regulatory requirements. 236 In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, the Court
rebuffed that effort, holding that new or modified stationary sources could not
be considered “major” stationary sources, and thus subject to regulation under
the CAA’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) program, solely on
the basis of the sources’ GHG emissions. 237 Nonetheless, the Court held that
EPA may require sources otherwise subject to the PSD program (due to
emissions of other, non-GHG pollutants) to employ “best available control
technology” to reduce GHG emissions. 238
Then EPA promulgated the most ambitious and controversial piece of the
Obama Administration’s climate plan, the Clean Power Plan (“CPP”), 239 which
included standards governing the largest class of stationary source contributions
of GHG emissions—existing power plants. 240 The CPP, adopted under Section
111(d) of the CAA, 241 established emission guidelines for states to adopt in their
plans for regulating GHG emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired electricity
generating units within their jurisdiction. The emission guidelines were based
on what EPA identified as the “best system of emission reduction” (“BSER”)
for these facilities. 242 The BSER selected by EPA included three components,
or “building blocks”:
• Heat rate improvements at coal-fired power plants
• Substituting electricity generation from higher-emitting coal-fired units
with generation from lower-emitting natural gas-fired units
• Substituting increased generation from zero-GHG-emitting renewable
energy capacity for generation from affected fossil fuel-fired plants. 243
Under Section 111(d) of the CAA, States develop and implement plans for
setting emission limitations for the affected facilities within their jurisdictions.
Those plans are subject to EPA approval. 244 If States fail to develop and
implement acceptable plans, the CAA authorizes EPA to develop and enforce a
plan of its own for those States. 245

236. The PSD program applies to areas that have attained one or more national ambient air
quality standards and requires new and certain modified existing “major” stationary sources to
obtain permits that include various regulatory requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a).
237. 573 U.S. 302, 325–28 (2014).
238. Id. at 328–34.
239. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015).
240. See ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, SOURCES OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, https://www.epa
.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).
241. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d); see 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015).
242. 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,663–64.
243. Id. at 64,667.
244. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1).
245. Id. § 7411(d)(2). For a discussion of Section 111(d), see Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 985
F.3d 914, 930–32 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
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The second and third building blocks of EPA’s BSER under the CPP, often
referred to as “generation-shifting” methods of controlling GHG emissions, 246
proved to be especially controversial. Opponents argued that these components
of BSER required actions beyond the physical site of the affected facilities and,
for that reason, exceeded EPA’s authority under Section 111(d). They claimed
that EPA’s authority is “limited to measures that are integrated into the source’s
design or operations” 247 or, as EPA would later characterize it, controls that “can
be put into operation at a building, structure, facility, or installation.” 248
The Trump Administration revoked or revised each of the Obama-era
climate change initiatives, building on President Trump’s campaign pledge to
dismantle climate regulations. The Trump EPA addressed GHG emissions from
motor vehicles in the Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (“SAFE”) Vehicle Rule,
which it issued in two parts. 249 In Part One, the Agency withdrew its waiver of
preemption under the CAA for California’s GHG and zero emission vehicles
standards, depriving California and other states of the ability to adopt motor
vehicle emissions limitations more stringent than those required by federal
law. 250 At the same time, NHTSA finalized a rule concluding that “any law or
regulation of a State or political subdivision of a State regulating or prohibiting”
or “having the direct or substantial effect of regulating or prohibiting tailpipe
carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles” is expressly preempted by the
EPCA. 251
NHTSA’s preemption rule was based on the EPCA’s preemption clause,
which provides:
When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this chapter is in
effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may not adopt or enforce a law
or regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy
standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel economy standard under
this chapter. 252

In NHTSA’s view, “a State or local requirement limiting tailpipe carbon dioxide
emissions from automobiles has the direct and substantial effect of regulating
fuel consumption and, thus, is ‘related to’ fuel economy standards.” 253 Similarly,
the agency concluded that “since carbon dioxide emissions constitute the
overwhelming majority of tailpipe carbon emissions, a State regulation of all
246. See Am. Lung Ass’n, 985 F.3d at 936 (citing 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,728–29 (Oct. 23,
2015)).
247. 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,767.
248. Am. Lung Ass’n, 985 F.3d at 938 (quoting 84 Fed. Reg. at 32,523–24).
249. 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (Part One); 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (Apr. 30, 2020)
(Part Two).
250. 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,337.
251. Id. at 51,362 (Appendix B to Part 531 – Preemption, §§ (a)(2)–(3)).
252. 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a).
253. 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,313.
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tailpipe greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles or prohibiting all tailpipe
emissions is also ‘related to’ fuel economy standards and preempted by
EPCA.” 254
For its part, EPA added that a waiver of preemption under the CAA does not
also waive preemption under the EPCA. 255 And for good measure, EPA
concluded that the CAA does not permit other states to adopt California GHG
emissions and zero emission vehicle standards under Section 177. The agency
concluded that Section 177 is intended only to address state planning for
controlling pollutants for which areas in the state are not attaining a national
ambient air quality standard; it was not intended to address “global air pollution”
like GHG emissions. 256 Accordingly, states may adopt California standards only
if EPA grants a waiver of preemption for those standards, and only if the
California standards “address air pollutants that affect local or regional air
quality and not those relating to global air pollution like GHGs.” 257
The Part One actions in the SAFE Vehicle Rule were broadly justified by
EPA and NHTSA as “the only way to create one actual, durable national
program,” which requires “GHG and fuel economy standards to be set by the
Federal government, as was intended by Congress in including express
preemption provisions in both the Clean Air Act (for new motor vehicle
emissions standards) and EPCA (for fuel economy).” 258 The agencies reached
this conclusion notwithstanding two decisions by federal district courts, each of
which concluded that California’s GHG and zero emission vehicle standards
were not preempted by the EPCA. 259 These courts both concluded that
California’s standards were not “related to” CAFÉ standards within the meaning
of the EPCA’s preemption provision. 260
In the second part of the SAFE Vehicles Rule, EPA and NHTSA
dramatically scaled back the GHG reductions called for in the Obama motor
vehicles emission rules. The new standards require GHG reductions to increase
in stringency by 1.5% per year from the standards governing Model Year 2020

254. 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310, 51,313 (Sept. 27, 2019) (Part One).
255. Id. at 51,324.
256. Id. at 51,351.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 51,311, 51,316–17 (discussing importance of “one national standard”).
259. See Green Mountain Chrysler v. Crombe, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007); Central
Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
260. See Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 354 (California regulation does not
“relate to” fuel economy within the meaning intended by Congress”); Central Valley ChryslerJeep, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (holding that “a law that requires substantial improvement in average
fleet mileage standards incidentally to its purpose of protecting public health and welfare does not
constitute a de facto regulation of fuel economy standards unless there is a narrow one-to-one
correlation between the pollution reduction regulation and the fuel efficiency standard” and
concluding that the California standards lacked such a correlation).
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vehicles over model years 2021–2026, 261 less than one-third of the reductions
required under the Obama rule. The agencies acknowledged that their standards
could result in over 900 million metric tons more of GHG emissions than the
Obama standards, the agencies maintained that the overall benefits of the new
standards outweighed these (and other) costs. 262 This conclusion was based, in
part, on differing methods employed by the agencies for calculating the costs
and benefits of the standards than the methods used by the Obama-era
agencies. 263
The Trump EPA revoked the Clean Power Plan and promulgated the
Affordable Clean Energy Rule (“ACE”) in its place. 264 The revocation of the
CPP was necessary, in EPA’s view, because it was inconsistent with the
limitations placed on EPA’s authority by the “only permissible reading” of
Section 111(d) of the CAA—the source of EPA’s authority to regulate GHG’s
emissions from existing power plants. 265 EPA explained that “[S]ection 111
unambiguously limits the BSER to those systems that can be put into operation
at a building, structure, facility, or installation,” 266 and “the BSER . . . may not
be premised on a system of emission reduction that is implementable only
through the combined activities of sources or non-sources.” 267 Because the
Clean Power Plan’s BSER was based on generation-shifting building blocks
(and emissions trading among sources), EPA concluded that it “contravenes the
plain language of CAA [S]ection 111(a)(1) [—which defines “best system of
emissions reduction”—] and must be repealed.” 268
In place of the revoked CPP, EPA promulgated the ACE, which concluded
that the BSER for existing coal-fired power plants should consist solely of heatrate improvement technologies and other practices that may be applied at these
plants. 269 These improvements generally improve a plant’s efficiency, enabling
more energy to be produced with lower amounts of coal. EPA did not address
BSER for plants using other fossil fuels, such as natural gas. The Agency
acknowledged that its chosen BSER technologies could result in greater GHG
emissions at some plants due to the “rebound effect.” 270 This effect occurs when
“sources increase . . . generation . . . as a result of lower operating costs from the
adoption of candidate technologies to improve their efficiency.” 271
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

85 Fed. Reg. 24,174–75 (Apr. 30, 2020).
Id.
See id. at 24,230–36.
84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019).
Id. at 32,529.
Id. at 32,524.
Id.
Id. at 32,527.
84 Fed. Reg. 32,520, 32,525, 32,537 (July 8, 2019).
Id. at 32,542.
Id.
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Notwithstanding this obviously undesirable result, the agency concluded its
BSER was appropriate because it “improves the emissions rate of designated
facilities and results in overall reductions.” 272
All of the Trump Administration’s climate-related actions discussed above
are being reviewed by the Biden Administration and are likely to be revised or
replaced. 273 In addition, in a recent decision, the D.C. Circuit vacated and
remanded the ACE rule to EPA, concluding that EPA had misinterpreted the
CAA. 274 The court held that “Section [111 of the CAA] does not, as the EPA
claims, constrain the Agency to identifying a best system of emission reduction
consisting only of controls ‘that can be applied at and to a stationary source.” 275
Thus, the court concluded that “EPA here ‘failed to rely on its own judgment
and expertise, and instead based its decision on an erroneous view of the
law.’” 276 The Biden Administration has not yet proposed a new Section 111(d)
rule to replace the ACE rule.
I do not devote a great deal of class time to the actions taken by the agencies
under the CAA and EPCA. I focus primarily on the actions described above,
emphasizing how the respective administrations’ policy preferences can yield
dramatically different results from the same statutory programs, sometimes at
the cost of legality or careful analysis. These differing approaches to
implementing our environmental laws underscore the fragility of our overall
system of environmental protection and the relatively non-existent role played
by the nation’s primary policy-making body—namely, Congress.
CONCLUSION
In our current era of highly partisan understandings of the need for and
desirability of environmental regulation, a change in presidential administrations
offers rich opportunities to revise and reshape the nation’s overall approach and
policies relating to protecting our shared environment. This is particularly true
due to relative absence of any new legislative initiatives. At times, changes in
the wake of presidential elections can be dramatic and, to many, disheartening,
as was the case with President Trump’s relentless assault on existing
environmental regulations, particularly the attacks on regulatory programs put
in place by the Obama Administration. Our challenge as educators and
environmental law scholars in our current political environment is determining
which of the many candidate actions can appropriately and effectively be
considered in the courses we offer to our students. We should make such
272. Id. at 32,543.
273. For the Biden administration’s actions on motor vehicle emissions, see REG. TRACKER,
supra note 7.
274. Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
275. Id. (quoting 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520, 32,534 (July 8, 2019).
276. Id. (quoting Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
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decisions based on how the actions we select for our classes deepen and enrich
our students’ understanding of how our current system functions, including its
doctrinal commitments and policy fluctuations, as well as the ways in which it
fails to function effectively and consistently. Teaching environmental law after
Trump makes these decisions more difficult, but potentially more rewarding and
informative.
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